Peace process in Syria: Talk, talk, kill, kill

The death of Zahran Alloush on December 25 is a reminder that the Syrian regime is willing to risk the Vienna process in order to further its own more direct interests.

By targeting Alloush, it appears that the Syrian regime is trying to restore its own agency in the shadow of the Vienna process.

  The peace plan and its constitutional milestones towards a better Syria are both ambitious and fragile: the plan has succeeded in crystallising parts of the Syrian opposition in Riyadh earlier in December and set in motion direct talks in the new year, making a rare optimism for 2016 to be the year in which the conflict goes in a better direction.

 
However, the killing of Alloush has already put a halt to the evacuation of opposition elements from the much beleaguered Yarmouk refugee camp and led other opposition leaders to question the regime's intentions towards the "peace" process.

Yet we should not forget that the Vienna process did not come about because of the desire of the regime. Indeed, the initial talks that set out the course ahead did not feature Syrian actors, but instead had patrons and allies from all sides around the table.

In contrast to the earlier Geneva process it appeared that in Vienna, global powers were serious enough about building a peace process that couldn't be hijacked by the main fighting protagonists themselves.

With the targeting of Alloush, it would appear likely that the Syrian regime is trying to restore its own agency in the shadow of a Vienna process by which it feels marginalised.

This is a period of huge danger and opportunity for the range of actors that make up the Syrian opposition. They face being labelled as "extremist" and excluded from the nascent peace process or being acknowledged as "moderate" legitimate players and then assassinated.

As Human Rights Watch's director Ken Roth tweeted, Alloush's killing "is part of Assad's strategy of trying to reduce [the] choice to him or ISIL". The importance of this moment is matched by the need for leadership among the opposition to ensure not only the right agreements within the Vienna process, but also to bring about legitimate implementation of any deal.
 
Leaders are important, and nowhere more so than in set peace conferences. Without these figures, we may be left with a shell of a process - all political theory but no actors left to carry it out. Bearing this importance in mind, the tactics of "decapitation" or targeting of an enemy's leadership are not new or original.
 
In December last year opposition groups in East Ghouta accused the regime of waging a campaign of targeted assassination against its leaders. Throughout the conflict numerous car bombs have killed opposition leaders without clarity over who was directly behind the attacks.

The Assad regime famously has links to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other "anti-Syrian" politicians in the country. It may be nominally happy to "talk" to the opposition, but we should be under no illusions that they would happier see them dead.

More dangerous for the fragile, ambitious but desperately needed process is if the Russians are found to be involved in the killing either directly (they carried out the air strike) or indirectly (it was their intelligence that led to Alloush's killing).