As the conflict in northern Mali endures, another hot spot south of
the Niger river is attracting increasing attention.It involves two main areas in the centre of the country: the Macina heartland (Fulani historical-political region, between Mopti and Segou) and the Hayré (northeast of Mopti).
The wave of dissent began shortly before the French military intervened against jihadis who had taken control of northern Mali in 2012.
In early 2013, Amadou Kufa, a Fulani Islamic preacher from central Mali and an ally of Iyad Ag Ghaly (leader of Ansar Dine, one of three jihadi groups in the north), summoned his fighters to expand south beyond the area under the jihadis’ control.
That triggered the French-led Operation Serval in 2013. When the Islamist coalition was ousted from the cities it controlled (including Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal), jihadi activity was reconfigured. Kufa, now allegedly commanding the katibat (brigade) called Ansar Dine Macina (formerly Front for the Liberation of Macina), still leads violent actions in central Mali.
However, it would be false to attribute political violence in this region solely to groups embracing jihad. At least two more rationales exist. One is about community self-defence. The other involves a struggle led by Fulani herdsmen, more vulnerable than other Fulani communities of the area.
Importantly, the “Fula” struggle does not exclusively target the state. Community elites, seen as state accomplices and advocates of an unsatisfactory status quo, are tacitly challenged, too.
Opportunistic banditry further complicates the situation.
Diverse dynamics
Recent violent clashes reflect the diversity of these dynamics. In August 2016, Nampala (in the west) suffered a deadly attack jointly claimed by the jihadis and armed groups claiming to defend the Fulani cause. In May, interethnic fights between Bambara and Fulani communities shook the Dioura area.To the east, ancient tensions between Dogon farmers and Fulani herders have fuelled frequent revenge attacks. The frequency of these has been exacerbated by the absence of the state since the March 2012 coup.
Further east, the border between Mali and Niger is another hotbed of tensions between Fulani herders and Tamasheq herders (also called Tuareg) in particular. Widespread cattle theft organised by criminal networks, competition for grazing land and jihad intermingle.
All this violence has caused exoduses to Burkina Faso and towards the Mauritanian camp of Mbera. The result is a deep humanitarian crisis.
Pointing the finger of local elites
In a shifting and fragmented political context, these conflicts obviously do not work independently of each other. There have been multiple alignments among protagonists including alliances, break-ups and short-term collaborations.In 2012, as Tamasheq separatists and then jihadis took partial control of central Mali, fractures re-opened among some elements of Fulani society, and between Fulanis and their neighbours. In the absence of the state and its army, local elites were seen as unable to protect citizens against the Tamasheqs of the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA).
Those previously threatened by the MNLA perceived its ousting by the jihadist Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) in summer 2012 as a partial relief.
Two recent reports, by the International Crisis Group and the anthropologist Boukary Sangare, detail how the MUJWA capitalised on the turbulent history between Fulanis and Tamasheqs and the immediate security needs of non-Tamasheq populations.
These alliances with the jihadis, oscillating between pragmatism and ideological adherence, were severely punished following the French intervention. In the Hayré (Douentza), according to multiple testimonies, Malian armed forces carried out numerous actions.
These included cattle theft, intimidation of local people, arbitrary arrests and sometimes summary executions.